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Summary 
 
The UK economic engine spluttered in early 2018, faced with some cold east 
winds and persistent policy doubts.  There should be some rebound from 
adverse weather effects, but other uncertainties will last a while longer.  
 
It is always a matter of concern when the inflation rate is higher than the 
growth rate.  It tends to mean a sluggish economy and constrained living 
standards.  With inflation rates easing and some signs of earnings growth, we 
must hope that this imbalance (see chart below) does not last long. 
 
Sadly, the consensus is that a modest outlook will persist.  For example, 
the OBR’s March forecast has real GDP growth at or below 1.5% per annum 
over the next five years with investment at 2.5% p.a. or less.   
 
This implies the ‘wrong’ kind of growth.  Rather than productivity-led, long-
term sustainable, ‘green’ growth fuelled by investment, innovation, skills, 
entrepreneurship and competitiveness, we have growth held back by  
1) subdued consumption - high debts, low real wages, an ageing population,  
2) an unsupportive policy mix - too loose money and high fiscal debt, and  
3) an uncertain global outlook - Brexit unknowns and President Trump’s 
mercantilism. 
  
																																																								1	This is the latest of a regular overview series of Business Intelligence Reports that BU 
produces for the Dorset and neighbouring business community and its partners. 
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Against this background, many Dorset businesses seem focused on the 
here and now and micro rather than macro prospects.  Local views are 
pointing in several different directions.  Some firms/sectors strive hard to fill 
near-term order books and manage skills shortages, whilst others fear 
unfavourable EU supply chain shifts from March 2019 (Brexit) onwards.   
 
Unfortunately, there are messages from local used car sales, garden centres, 
and other leisure and retail services that final (consumer) demand has 
softened in recent months.  Household spending is not growing robustly, 
especially in real terms.  This has affected retailers in the high street, tourism 
and other consumer services, and elements of discretionary construction.  In 
contrast, high-end manufacturers and most business services remain 
relatively buoyant.  Current trading and investment seem to be driven by 
capital replacement and capacity maintenance rather than building future 
growth potential. 
 
 
Nigel F Jump, Professor in Regional Economic Development 
 
 
The UK Economy 
 
LATEST EVIDENCE 
 Annual (2017) Quarterly Monthly 
Real GDP (%ch, yoy) +1.9 +1.2 (Q1) n.a. 
CPI inflation (%ch, yoy) +2.7 +2.7 (Q1) +2.5 (Mar) 
LFS unemployment (%) 4.4   4.4 (Q4) 4.2 (Dec-Feb) 
Current Account (£bn) -82.9 -18.4(Q4) n.a. 
Base rate (%) 0.29   0.5 (Q1) 0.5 (Apr) 
Source: ONS 
 
The UK economy (see table above and chart below) slowed through 2017 
and has started 2018 sluggishly – just 0.1% qoq growth in the first three 
months.  There have been signals of weak consumption and investment 
growth, dampened by modest expectations about future earnings and profits. 
Surveys of consumer confidence have been softening. 
 
The international environment has not helped, with a number of trade and 
diplomatic factors adding uncertainty – threatening a ‘cold war’ and a ‘trade 
war’.  The US President is risking a return of mercantilism: the belief that it is 
the share of the cake, rather than the size of the cake, that matters.  Such 
economic policies were abandoned a century and a half ago – their revival 
now would be a retrograde step.   
 
Meanwhile, all this political controversy has been reflected in a stock market 
correction, commodity price swings and volatile exchange rates, adding 
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market uncertainty to political and policy uncertainty.  No wonder more people 
are back to a ‘wait and see’ mode of thinking, planning and commitment. 
 
The essence of the problem, with or without Brexit, is that the UK economy 
has experienced the ‘wrong’ kind of growth for a number of years, almost to 
the point of establishing a ‘new normal’.  The monetary and fiscal policy mix 
adopted to deal with the risks of debt and depression at the start of this 
decade seem intractable.  At the same time, household and business 
prospects are constrained, and constraining, in an economy not built on 
productivity but on debt and cheap labour. 
 
Crucially, the UK growth/inflation mix (discussed earlier and below) and the 
debt/deficits mix are unfavourable.  The current account deficit remains large 
(3.6% of GDP in Q4 2017) and the public debt ratio huge at 86% (fiscal 
2017/18).  An ageing population, falling household living standards, weak 
investment incentives also contribute to the ‘wrong’ kind of growth, with low 
creative destruction and poor competitive aspiration.   
 
Although some improvement was experienced in the second half of 2017, the 
“productivity puzzle” persists, with output per hour still about 20% below trend 
and the ‘gap’ with our competitors not shrinking.  In essence, we have too 
many low value jobs in a weak investment cycle and not enough robust 
supply chains based on ‘collaborative yet competitive’ business relationships. 
 
Growth, Inflation & Unemployment: 1989 Q1 – 2018 Q1 
 
Source: ONS: Growth = real gross domestic product (GDP) % change year-on-year (yoy),  
Inflation = Consumer Price Iindex (CPI) % ch yoy, and Unemployment = Labour Force Survey 
(LFS) % rate. 
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OBR FORECASTS 
 
The Spring release by the OBR in March barely changed its forecasts from 
November.  The key messages were: 
 
§ The cyclical economy is weak: growth is not expected to exceed 1.5% 
per annum between now and 2022. 
 
§ The structural economy is weak: growth potential remains modest by 
historical standards because productivity is still poor. 
 
§ The fiscal economy is weak: the public finances remain precarious - 
the deficit is shrinking but the debt burden is not. 
 
Essentially, the OBR is predicting more of the same over the forecast 
period: growth not fuelled enough by investment, productivity and real 
earnings.   The economy is operating near to potential and there is little spare 
capacity.  In the near term, Brexit uncertainty may dampen domestic and 
foreign direct investment, whilst reducing net positive immigration, compared 
with what otherwise might have occurred. 
 
The wider consensus is the same.  The latest HM Treasury compilation has 
growth of 1.5% in 2018 and 1.4% in 2019.  The UK economy is precariously 
balanced with low growth and higher inflation (2.3% and 2.1% respectively).  
Historically, if it persists, the latter being at a higher rate than the former has 
proved uncomfortable for growth and jobs. 
 
 
ECONOMIC STABILITY 
 
Interest rates remain very low and are only expected to increase slowly over 
the next few years.  At some point, base rates probably need to get back to 
about 3.0-3.5% (roughly equivalent to underlying nominal GDP growth), if pre-
Great Recession ‘normality’ is to be restored.   
 
As long as this is done in small, slow steps, such an adjustment need not hurt 
overall economic growth.  There may be some pain for over-extended 
household and corporate debtors who may not have planned properly for 
higher rates, but a gradual process of change to more ‘normal’ interest levels 
will improve resource allocation for and by most economic actors in time – a 
likely condition for getting the economy working sustainably towards 
the ‘right’ kind of growth. 
 
The question, however, is whether pre-2010 ‘normality’ is a viable target or 
only of academic/historical interest.  The west’s policy response to the debt 
crisis, including zero interest rates and ballooning central bank balance sheets 
(quantitative easing - QE), avoided a Great Depression.  But, the resulting, 
persistent debt pile (worldwide over $230trn and over 300% of GDP), was 
merely shifted from private to public balance sheets.  This implies a risk of a 
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renewed funding default if creditors lose confidence in the ability of debtors to 
repay, particularly as the costs of borrowing (bond yields) edge higher. 
 
As the central banks start to unwind the ‘2010-model’, it is not clear that a 
return to the ‘old normal’ is possible.  The risk is that another crisis hits 
when the authorities have less room for manoeuvre: a drop of interest 
rates of the scale seen at the start of the decade to support activity levels is 
not now feasible.  With growth at no more than 1.5% per annum, a fairly small 
negative ‘shock’ could push the UK towards recession and the Bank of 
England has less room to do anything about it.  In this respect, current 
evidence of a softening of final demand is worrying.  Moreover, it makes a 
shift towards more sustainable investment and productivity-led growth even 
more urgent. 
 
 
 
The Dorset Economy 
 
LATEST DATA & SURVEYS  
 
The anecdotal evidence is that the local economy lost a little momentum 
in early 2018 but experience was highly variable.   
 
Retailers, manufacturers, consumer services and construction companies 
report very mixed performances across a range: 
 
‘struggling to fulfil current contracts and order books amidst skills 
shortages’ or  
‘struggling to maintain demand without discounting and offers that 
undermine profitability’.   
 
There are wide differences between businesses orientated to domestic 
markets (sluggish household expenditure) and exporters (tail-end of the 2016 
sterling boost) and also between those who have long or short lead times in 
their supply chains.  There are rumours that orders for a year ahead (post 
Brexit) are not matching previous ‘normal’ experience in some supply chains. 
 
Despite some doubts about the ‘medium-term’ future, current business 
surveys remain quite good. 
 
§ The latest Federation of Small Businesses Survey (March 2018) 
was more optimistic, on average, than the late 2017 version.  
Nevertheless, there was significant variation between the negativity in 
retail accommodation and food services and positivity in 
manufacturing, and professional and scientific services. 
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§ Similarly, the most recent British Chamber of Commerce Survey 
talked of the economy “treading water despite the export boost”.  
Consumer-orientated businesses are faring worse than business-to-
business.  With members’ cash flow tightening, the BCC called for 
“fixing the fundamentals” of infrastructure, skills and over-
regulation/taxation”. 
 
§ The various Purchasing Managers’ surveys show an economy that is 
growing modestly.  The regional measures for SW and SE England 
recorded positive activity balances of 54.3 and 53.2 respectively in 
March – both above the UK average.  There is an interesting contrast 
between good new orders and not so good business outstanding in SE 
England.  In SW England, however, business outstanding is strong.  As 
a result, many local respondents remain reasonably positive about the 
future (see chart below). 
 
 
PMI Future Outlook balances: July 2012 - March 2018 
 
Source: Markit for Lloyds 
 
Meanwhile, in 2017, Dorset’s labour market remained tight. The UK average 
employment rate was 74.7% and the unemployment rate was 4.4%.  On the 
latter, Dorset as a whole and the various parts of Dorset were ‘better’ than 
average (see table below).  As usual, the more urban areas were looser than 
more rural. 
 
Overall, Dorset has little problem employing residents who want and are 
able to work.  It is the productivity of the labour force that needs more 
attention. 
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Local Labour Indicators (Jan - Dec 2017) 
 Emp % Unemp %  Emp % Unemp % 
Bournemouth 75.8 4.0 Dorset 79.4 2.5 
Poole 76.8 2.9 Somerset 75.9 3.9 
Christchurch 80.9 2.3 Devon 80.9 2.6 
East Dorset 83.1 2.2 Wiltshire 82.0 2.9 
North Dorset 81.8 2.4 Southampton 74.0 4.4 
Purbeck 83.4 2.4 Portsmouth 73.7 4.1 
West Dorset 78.3 2.6 Hampshire 82.0 2.8 
Weymouth & 
Portland 
70.3 3.2 Isle of Wight 72.7 4.2 
Source: ONS 
employment 16-64 age groups, APS. unemployment 16+ economically active 
 
 
STRUCTURAL FEATURES 
 
With the government’s recent agreement that Dorset will have just two unitary 
authorities from April 2019: - Bournemouth, Christchurch and Poole (City 
Dorset) and East Dorset, North Dorset, West Dorset, Purbeck, and Weymouth 
and Portland (County Dorset), the statistical landscape will be changing for 
our £16-17bn a year economy.  We do not yet know how ONS will deal with 
the change in political geography  For now, we can estimate that ‘City Dorset’ 
will have GVA per head of about £22,000 a year whilst ‘County Dorset’ will be 
just under £18,000 a year (2016 prices).  
 
On average, Dorset is now more than 20% below the UK average on the GVA 
per head measure.  Its relative position has been slipping for about a 
decade and a half.  In 2000, it was not quite 10% below average.  By 2016, it 
had lost a further 10 points of comparative ground. 
 
This pattern is alarming but, sadly, not unusual.  The divergence between 
above and below average has widened generally across the country, with the 
Greater London ‘black-hole’ pulling away from most other regions.  It is 
disappointing for Dorset, nevertheless: local productive potential and 
performance is not keeping pace in relative terms.   
 
This is further evidence of the ‘wrong’ kind of growth not producing optimal 
local well-being and prosperity.  Productivity-led, long-term sustainable, 
‘green’ growth remains mere aspiration.  Growth is being pulled along by 
sluggish demand factors more than it is being pushed along by supply factors.  
This is inadequate to offset (consistently) some of the negative externalities, 
such as environmental degradation and congestion.  Moreover, the ‘demand 
pull’ seems to be itself wavering with no sign of a countervailing ‘supply push’. 
 
The two new unitary authorities, the Dorset LEP and all others engaged in 
local economic development will have to address these structural and cyclical 
conundrums in their future economic strategies. 
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There is scope for long-term economic optimism, however.  At some point, 
Brexit uncertainty will be removed.  Mitigation and substitution can evolve, 
productivity will recover, and a ‘new’ psychology of supply chains and markets 
should emerge.  With better ‘agglomeration’ and connectivity, more access 
and aspiration, and new demographic and technological change, there is no 
reason why the inherent entrepreneurial/innovatory spirit of today’s (and 
tomorrow’s) young economic entrants cannot emerge without sound invention 
and skill.   
 
What might be termed the “digi-yoof” generation, now moving through our 
secondary and tertiary education systems, will be the product and business 
creators and the market drivers of a decade ahead.  They will be “doing 
things better” and “doing better things”.  With this hopeful prospect, all of us 
engaged in local economic development need to “collaborate to compete”, 
sharing ‘best practice’, offering ‘fresh opportunity’ and eliminating ‘peripheral 
Dorset’ from the local lexicon.  Creating the infrastructure and other conditions 
for business growth, in real and psychological terms, is vital. 
 
 
